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Abstract: We introduce an approach to iteratively design ‘small’ social networks used
in software engineering together with methods analyzing the cooperation in the system.
The degree of cooperation is measured by the emergence of coalitions and their stability
over time. At the most abstract level, which we call the coalition view, coalitions are
abstract entities that may dominate or attack other coalitions. During iterative design,
these abstract entities are refined with agents and their dependencies constituting the
coalitions (dependence view), the powers of sets of agents to see to goals (power view)
and finally the beliefs, plans, tasks and goals of agents (agent view). The analysis
methods predict the emergence of coalitions based on reciprocity and argumentation
theory.
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1 Introduction
A social network is a social structure composed by nodes, which are generally
individuals or organizations, that are tied by one or more speciﬁc types of in-
terdependency. Wide social networks and small ones share the same structure
but diﬀerent kinds of analysis are needed. The analysis of large social networks
[Hanneman and Riddle 2005] is usually based on either data-mining or graph-
based techniques, such as small world properties, centrality, cliques, similarity,
and so on. These analysis tools work well for large networks, such as those com-
posed by the nodes in the world wide web or the members of FaceBook, but they
work less well for small networks representing the relations among stakeholders
in software engineering. Moreover, they do not support iterative design of soft-
ware in order to interact with the designed system to provide a form of research
for informing and evolving a project, as successive versions.
Small social networks are analyzed in software engineering, for example by the
TROPOS methodology [Bresciani et el. 2004], developed for agent-oriented de-
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sign of software systems. The intuition of the TROPOS methodology
[Bresciani et el. 2004] is to couple the instruments oﬀered by software engineer-
ing and the multiagent paradigm. In this paradigm, the entities composing the
system are agent, autonomous by deﬁnition, characterized by their own sets of
goals, capabilities and beliefs. The multiagent paradigm allows the cooperation
among the agents with the aim to obtain common and personal goals. In this
way, multiagent systems oﬀer a solution for open, distributed and complex sys-
tems and the approach combining software engineering and multiagent systems
is deﬁned Agent-Oriented Software Engineering. A typical social dependence
network in the TROPOS methodology [Bresciani et el. 2004] contains at most
a hundred nodes, in contrast to the hundreds of thousands of nodes used in the
web or in FaceBook.
In this paper, we are interested in the analysis based on cooperation which
emerges in ‘small’ social networks in order to achieve a greater number of goals.
As a measure of cooperation, we analyze the coalitions [Shehory and Kraus 1998]
that emerge in a social network assuming reciprocity, for example measuring the
number of coalitions [van der Torre and Villata 2009], the kinds of coalitions
[Boella et al. 2008], or the stability of the coalitions. This breaks down in the
following questions.
1. How to iteratively design a social network?
2. How to analyze the reciprocity based coalitions that may emerge in social
networks at various degrees of abstraction?
3. How to reﬁne the abstract coalition models with social dependencies among
agents, powers of sets of agents, and plans or tasks?
At the highest level of abstraction, coalitions are purely abstract and we
only specify whether the creation of one coalition will block the creation of
another coalition. We say that two coalitions are attacking each other and the
stability argument sets a preference of the ﬁrst coalition over the second one,
and we use abstract argumentation theory [Bench-Capon and Dunne 2007] to
determine the acceptable coalitions. At the second level of abstraction, we detail
the composition of a coalition which is seen as a set of agents and a set of
dependencies between them. Our notion of coalition is based on the concept
of reciprocity which constraints each node to contribute something, and to get
something out of it. For example, in a virtual organization each node has to be
useful for another node. At the third level of abstraction, we detail the powers
and goals of the individual agents. At the fourth level of abstraction, we also
detail the beliefs, decisions and goals of the agents. For the analysis we focus on
the coalition and dependence views, and leave a detailed analysis of the power
and agent views for further research.
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We illustrate our approach using a grid scenario. Consider, for example, a
virtual organization for e-Science composed by nodes belonging to academic
institutions such as universities and research centers. Inside the virtual organi-
zation, sub-groups can be formed with the aim to collaborate in order to achieve
a greater number of goals, i.e., if node a cannot store a ﬁle but it can help node
b in doing a computation and b can store a’s ﬁle, these two nodes form a reci-
procity based coalition in order to achieve both goals. It would be possible that
two or more candidate coalitions share the same goals, e.g. two nodes can do the
storage for node a and thus it becomes necessary to have a mechanism to decide
what coalition can be formed.
Using social dependence networks to represent the multiagent system, as
in TROPOS [Bresciani et el. 2004], allows us to model, particularly for the re-
quirements analysis phase of the design process, the domain stakeholders. The
analysis of cooperation in this context is relevant since agents can form coalitions
with the aim to achieve more goals than what they can achieve alone. As in well
known game theoretic approaches to cooperation [Shehory and Kraus 1998], we
face with problems of incompatibilities between the possible coalitions which can
be formed. We manage these incompatibilities using an argumentation frame-
work treating each candidate coalition as an argument, the incompatibilities as
the attacks between the arguments and, ﬁnally, using the extensions to ﬁnd out
the acceptable coalitions.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a grid-based sce-
nario showing how the presented methods can be used to model real systems.
In Section 3, we present how to argue about the coalition view level using an
argumentation framework. Section 4 presents how to argue about the dynamic
dependence view level to know which coalitions are formed. In Section 5, we
present the agent view and the power view. Related work and conclusions end
the paper.
2 Iterative social network design
In this section, we answer to the ﬁrst research question, presenting the four
viewpoints composing our iterative design model and we describe the concepts
we use in the model thanks to an ontology. Moreover, we provide a running
scenario based on the grid architecture explaining our model of iterative design
for small social networks.
2.1 Coalitions in a grid-based scenario
Cooperation in grid, in particular virtual organizations, can be seen as coali-
tion formation in social networks. A virtual organization allows the users, their
roles and the resources they can access in a collaborative project to be deﬁned
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[Foster et al. 2001]. In particular, we look into small sets of nodes within virtual
organizations as coalitions. Reciprocity-based coalitions can be viewed as subsets
of a virtual organization, in which there is the constraint that each node has to
contribute something, and has to get something out of it.
The scenario of virtual organizations based on grid networks represents a case
study able to underline the beneﬁts of the presented viewpoints and the argu-
mentation framework to argue about the evolution of coalitions over time. First
of all, in the multiagent paradigm agents’ autonomy is assumed in all represen-
tations, i.e., the grid philosophy imposes the autonomy of the nodes composing
it. Second, the presented model depicts the system using dependence networks,
structures similar to the grid network itself. Finally, the idea that subsets of
nodes composing a virtual organization compose also diﬀerent coalitions sharing
common goals and attacking each others helps in providing the intuition of the
addressed problem and the proposed solutions.
Concerning viewpoints, a virtual organization can be represented using our
four views in order to highlight diﬀerent aspects: the agent view presents each
node of the grid as an agent with a set of associated skills and goals, the power
view presents the nodes which can achieve the goals of the virtual organization
and what are the nodes with the conditional power to add new goals to the
other nodes, the dynamic dependence view describes the virtual organization
in terms of dependencies giving it a network structure and, ﬁnally, the coalition
view represents the virtual organization as sets of nodes representing reciprocity-
based groups. In this context, the modeled stakeholders represent the nodes of
the virtual organization and their concern is to store and run data.
2.2 Ontology
In this section, we introduce the ontology used in our model, represented as
a UML diagram shown in Figure 1. This ontology summarizes the concepts
introduced in our four views. Particularly, it introduces the concepts of agent,
fact, skill and goal. Each agent has a set of facts in which it believes and a
set of goals that it has to achieve by means of its skills and these relations are
represented by the agent view. Figure 1 presents two kinds of dependencies,
dependencies and dynamic dependencies. The ﬁrst one explain that an agent
(depender) depends on another agent (dependee) to achieve a goal (dependum)
while dynamic dependencies enable the addition or removal of dependencies by
a third agent (dyndep creator). The notion of coalition, with its subclasses, is
linked to both the concepts of common and dynamic dependency and agent since
we deﬁne a coalition as a set of dependencies and agents. The preference of one
coalition over the other one is represented by the higher order dependency which
is a dynamic dependency. Finally, we introduce in our four views the concept of
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time representing the agents, the dependencies and the coalitions present in the
system in each time instant.
Figure 1: UML diagram of the ontology of our model.
2.3 Iterative design: refining viewpoints on grid-based coalitions
Figure 2 illustrates the iterative design of the grid scenario. It contains our four
viewpoints and the reﬁnement relations between them. Each row in the table
explains one viewpoint. Going from one row to the one below is a reﬁnement,
and going to a row above is an abstraction. The designer starts with the top row,
and reﬁnes it in each step to the row below it. It can well be that the designer
encounters a problem in a more reﬁned view and then has to adapt the more
abstract views, leading to the iterative design cycle. However, here we consider
only the reﬁnements of the views, not the revisions or updates of them.
n this section, we describe the four viewpoints in detail. For each viewpoint
represented by a row, the leftmost column summarizes the part of the ontology
used for this viewpoint. The next two columns visualize the ﬁrst two elements of
the temporal sequence within the viewpoint. The rightmost column gives some
additional explanation on the grid example. The analysis method is implicitly
represented in the example. Cooperation is represented by straight and dashed
lines. A straight line represents the candidate coalition, and a dashed line rep-
resents that it is not formed.
The coalition view, in Figure 3, represents the most abstract viewpoint used
to argue on coalitions. Concepts used in this viewpoint are two kinds of nodes,
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Figure 2: Iterative social network design.
called coalitions and stability argument, and one kind of relation, called dom-
inance or attack. The attack relation between candidate coalitions inﬂuences
which coalition will be formed. In the grid example, we distinguish two candi-
date coalitions, formed by nodes of a virtual organization, attacking each other,
and one stability argument, preferring the ﬁrst candidate coalition over the sec-
ond one. This stability argument attacks the attack from the candidate coalition
C2 to the candidate coalition C1 at time instant t1, and this second-order attack
leads to the formation of coalition C1. The stability argument can itself be at-
tacked by another stability argument in an higher order attack, not represented
in the ﬁgure.
Figure 3: Coalition view.
The dynamic dependence view, in Figure 4, represents a reﬁnement of the
coalition view, because we introduce the agents and the dependencies that con-
stitute the coalitions. Concepts used in this viewpoint are one kind of node,
agents, and two kinds of relations, representing respectively simple dependen-
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Figure 4: Dynamic dependence view.
cies and higher order dependencies. The goals are represented only as labels of
the dependence relations. In the grid example, each coalition consists of three
nodes. A node can depend on two other nodes for the same goal, as in the case
of node d for goal g1 or two nodes can depend on the same node for a shared
goal, as in the case of nodes a and c for goal g4. The dynamic dependency of
the example sees node f able to delete the dependency between itself and node
d concerning goal g3.
In the power view, in Figure 5,we reﬁne the dynamic dependence view. Con-
cepts used in this viewpoint are the same nodes as before, agents and goals, but
three new relations, one associating agents with goals (goals), one which says
which goals a set of agents can achieve (power), and one which represents which
sets of goals can be created or destroyed by an agent (power-goal). Likewise
there is the possibility to create or destroy powers, not directly represented in
the ﬁgure. The power relation is depicted as a square including agents and goals
and the power-goal relation is depicted as a squared goal linked to the agents
that can add or remove it. In the grid example, node f has the power-goal to
delete its goal g3 while node d has the power to see to g3.
Figure 5: Power view.
In the agent view, in Figure 6, we ﬁnally reﬁne the power view. The used
concepts are skills and rules. Each agent has some skills, whereas in the power
view, each set of agents has power. So the power view is more “social” than the
agent view. In Figure 2, skills are represented for each agent whereas the power
is represented for a set of agents, as indicated by the square around them. The
agent view is the most detailed view since it considers all the features of the
single agents but it looses the notion of “group” in the power view.
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Figure 6: Agent view.
3 Arguing on abstract coalitions models
In this section, we answer to the second research question presenting the ab-
stract coalitions models on which we analyze reciprocity based coalitions that
may emerge in social networks at the higher level of abstraction. This can be
speciﬁed by the following subquestion: How to represent coalition formation and
coalitional game theory in Dung’s argumentation theory? [Dung 1995] introduces
game theory as one of the three applications of his abstract theory (besides non-
monotonic reasoning and logic programming), and [Amgoud 2005] shows how to
instantiate preference-based argumentation with a task-based coalition forma-
tion theory. However, in [Amgoud 2005], arguments why one coalition would be
preferred over another one are not open for debate. In our approach, the prefer-
ence between arguments is deﬁned in terms of the stability argument. This addi-
tional argument sets the preference of one arguments over the others, attacking
the attacks towards the preferred arguments. The name stability argument is
used to express coalitions’ evolution where, on the one hand, coalition’s stability
is maintained if the coalition is not attacked by the other coalitions, and, on the
other hand, the stability is destroyed if the coalition is not preferred over the
others and thus it is attacked by some other coalitions.
3.1 Dung’s abstract argumentation framework
We follow [Baroni and Giacomin 2007]. An underlying mechanism of argument
generation deﬁnes a set of arguments, which is typically inﬁnite, and which we
call the universe of arguments and represent by U . An acceptance function E is
a function that associates with a set of arguments B ⊆ U , a set of arguments
produced by a reasoner at a given time instant, and a binary relation→⊆ B×B,
representing the dominance or attack relation among these arguments. We use
this acceptance function to obtain the acceptable arguments due to the chosen
acceptability semantics.
Definition 1. Let U be the universe of arguments. An acceptance function
E : 2U × 2U×U → 22U is a partial function which is deﬁned for each argumen-
tation framework 〈B,→〉 with ﬁnite B ⊆ U and →⊆ B×B, and which associates
with argumentation framework 〈B,→〉 sets of subsets of B: E(〈B,→〉) ⊆ 2B.
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Baroni and Giacomin identify the following two fundamental principles un-
derlying the deﬁnition of extension-based semantics in Dung’s framework, the
language independent principle and the conflict free principle. The notion of con-
ﬂict free is provided below. A further discussion on these principles is provided
in [Baroni and Giacomin 2007]
Definition 2 Conflict free. Given an argumentation frameworkAF = 〈B,→〉,
a set S ⊆ B is conflict free, denoted as cf(S), iﬀ  ∃α, β ∈ S such that a → β. A
semantics S satisﬁes the CF principle if and only if ∀AF, ∀E ∈ ES(AF ) : cf(E).
Given an argumentation framework AF , the various semantics of the argu-
mentation framework are all based on the notion of defense. A set of arguments
S defends an argument a when for each attacker b of a, there is an argument
in S that attacks b. A set of acceptable arguments is called an extension. The
following deﬁnition summarizes the most widely used acceptability semantics,
that satisfy these two principles. Which semantics is most appropriate depends
on the application domain of the argumentation theory.
Definition 3 Acceptability semantics. Let AF = 〈B,→ 〉 be an argumenta-
tion framework. Let S ⊆ B. S defends a if ∀b ∈ B such that b → a, ∃c ∈ S such
that c → b. Let D(S) = {a | S defends a}.
S ∈ Eadmiss(AF ) iﬀ cf(S) and S ⊆ D(S).
S ∈ Ecompl(AF ) iﬀ cf(S) and S = D(S).
S ∈ Eground(AF ) iﬀ S is the smallest Ecompl(AF ).
S ∈ Epref(AF ) iﬀ S is a maximal S ∈ Eadmiss(AF ).
S ∈ E skep-pref(AF ) iﬀ S = ∩Epref(AF ).
S ∈ Estable(AF ) iﬀ cf(S) and ∀b ∈ B\S∃a ∈ S : a → b.
Our theory of argumentation is based on the following three steps:
1. Extend the set of arguments with auxiliary arguments;
2. Calculate the extensions of the extended theory using Dung’s semantics;
3. For each extension of the extended theory, ﬁlter out the auxiliary arguments;
the resulting sets of arguments are the extensions of the theory.
We propose to consider as arguments both single arguments, as in classical
Dung’s theory, and attacks between arguments, called attack arguments. In this
way, we simplify the calculation of the Dung’s semantics in the case of attacks
of attacks, represented as usual attacks between arguments. In order to add the
arguments for the attacks, we need to represent each single argument as com-
posed by two parts, the in argument and the out argument. The out arguments
are auxiliary arguments while the in ones represent the real arguments.
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To deﬁne a particular argumentation framework, we have to deﬁne on the
one hand how the set of arguments with auxiliary arguments is generated from
the set of atomic arguments, and on the other hand which conditions argumen-
tation frameworks have to satisfy, i.e., for which argumentation frameworks the
acceptance function is deﬁned.
3.2 Arguing about preferences among coalitions
[Modgil 2007] observes that a preference of argument a over argument b can be
seen as an attack on the attack from b to a, in the sense that if a is preferred to
b, then b cannot attack a. He introduces a three place attack relation, which we
call here second-order attack, and [Modgil and Bench-Capon 2008] show how
hierarchical second order argumentation can be represented in Dung’s theory
using attack arguments. This is visualized using our argumentation approach in
Figure 8.a. The coalition argument D attacks the coalition argument C, but this
attack is itself attacked by the stability argument B. In other words, we see each
candidate coalition as an argument. Candidate coalition D attacks candidate
coalition C and the stability argument B attacks this attack to set a preference
between the two candidate coalitions. This is a second order attack.
Figure 7: (a) Modgil - Bench-Capon scheme, (b) Higher order argumentation.
In Figure 7, we have two kinds of arguments, the atomic arguments and the
attack arguments. We represent with the grey arrow the support relation between
two arguments, e.g. argument D supports argument D ⇒ C, and with the black
arrow the attack relation between two arguments, e.g. the stability argument
B attacks the attack argument D ⇒ C. An argument can support another
argument, e.g. an agent gives an argument which conﬁrms a premise used by an
argument provided by another agent. In our approach, the support is provided by
an atomic argument for an attack argument and, usually, the supporter argument
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is the attacker of the attack argument to which it provides support. Attacking
the attack argument D ⇒ C, the stability argument B establishes the preference
of argument C over argument D.
Moreover, [Barringer et al. 2005] argue that the attack of B to D ⇒ C can
itself be attacked, where⇒ represents the attack. This leads to a notion of higher
order attack, which we represent in our argumentation theory by Figure 8.b and
Deﬁnition 4.
In coalition formation, typically coalition D and coalition C conﬂict, so D
not only attacks C, but C also attacks D. This represents that the coalitions
cannot or should not be formed together. The stability argument B represents
a preference setting that coalition C is better than coalition D. Also argument
E is a stability argument and it attacks the relevance of the stability argument
B changing the total preference over the coalitions. At this level of abstraction,
conﬂicts are not explicitly deﬁned while they are described in details in the
reﬁned dynamic dependence view. Deﬁnition 4 represents our coalition view
with higher order attacks.
Figure 8: Expanded version of Figure 7 with in and out arguments.
Definition 4. Let A0 be a set of atomic arguments and a0 /∈ A0 a dummy
argument. Let U be the minimal set of arguments such that a0 ∈ U and:
1. If a in A0, a∈ in U
2. If a, b in A0, then a ⇒ b in A1 and in U
3. If a in A0 and α in A1, then a ⇒ α in A1 and in U
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For an argumentation framework 〈A,→〉, we have:
1. a∈ in A iﬀ a ∈ A, and if a∈ in A, then a∈ → a ∈.
2. if a ⇒ α in A then a, α ∈ A, and a ∈ → (a ⇒ β) and (a ⇒ β) → β.
3. there are no other attacks involved with a/∈, and a ⇒ b does not attack any
other arguments.
Deﬁnition 4 is composed by two phases. First, the universal set of arguments
is constructed, composed by the atomic arguments (1), the set of attacks between
atomic arguments (2) and the set of attacks of atomic arguments to attack argu-
ments. Second, for an argumentation framework 〈A,→〉, auxiliary arguments are
added, particularly for each atomic argument we add two auxiliary arguments
with the in argument attacking the out argument where a → b means the attack
between every kind of arguments (1), each attack from an atomic argument to
an attack argument is represented as an attack of the out auxiliary argument
associated to the attacker to the attack argument and the attack of the attack
argument to the attacked argument (2).
Figure 8 presents the expanded version of the argumentation frameworks rep-
resented in Figure 7. The main diﬀerence consists in the representation of the
arguments by means of two auxiliary arguments, e.g., argument a is represented
with the two auxiliary arguments a∈ and a/∈. These auxiliary arguments come
from the Jacobovits - Vermeir - Caminada labeling [Caminada 2006] and repre-
sent whether the argument a is an element of the set of acceptable arguments
or not. As a more involved example, consider the addition of attack arguments.
In that case, we like to represent the attack from argument a to argument b
by adding an attack argument a ⇒ b in between. This attack argument itself
attacks auxiliary argument b∈, which represents that if the attack argument is
accepted, we cannot have that argument b is accepted. Moreover, if the attack
argument is not accepted, because it is itself attacked, then auxiliary argument
b∈ can be accepted, and thus argument b can be accepted. However, how do we
represent that if argument a is not accepted, i.e. if the auxiliary argument a∈
is not accepted, then we cannot have an attack from a to b either? We cannot
represent this by an attack from auxiliary argument a∈ to the attack argument,
but we represent it by an attack from the auxiliary argument a/∈ to the attack
argument.This illustrates the essential role of out auxiliary arguments in the
representation of second or higher order attacks.
Example 1 shows the application of our argumentation framework to compute
which coalition is formed in each time instant using, e.g., the preferred semantics.
Example 1. Let us consider the example depicted in Figure 9. Figure 9.a rep-
resents the case of three candidate coalitions which aim to be formed in the
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Figure 9: Candidate coalitions attacking each other from Example 1.
context of a virtual organization in a grid and this leads to the following at-
tacks: C1 ⇒ C2 and C2 ⇒ C3. Moreover, there is also the second-order attack:
C3 ⇒ (C1 ⇒ C2). The aim of our arguing model is to decide what coalition will
be formed in this case. In Figure 9.a, candidate coalition C3 knows that the only
way to be formed consists in avoiding the formation of candidate coalition C2. C3
has the possibility to attack C1’s attack due to its powers, speciﬁed at the lower
level of abstraction, of adding or deleting one or more of the dependencies com-
posing C1. C3 decides to not use its capability of attacking the attack C1 ⇒ C2.
The decision of C3 of avoiding the second order attack (represented by the meta-
argument ZC3) in order to be formed or not is represented by means of adding an
higher order attack of C3 or not to its second order attack C3 ⇒ (C1 ⇒ C2). In
the ﬁgure, higher order attacks are depicted as dotted arrows, while second order
ones are depicted as dashed arrows on the left part and modelled as arguments
in the central one. Let AF = 〈B,→〉 be our argumentation framework with
C1, C2, C3 ⊆ U , then the extensions of the argumentation framework, E(AF),
are as follows: if an higher order attack attacking the second order attack is
added to the argumentation framework, E(AF) = {C1, C3}, while without the
higher-order attack E(AF) = {C1, C2}. Thus, C3 should add the higher order
attack to inhibit the second order one, otherwise, C3 will not be formed. Recall
that while higher order attacks to second order attacks exiting from a coalition
can be added by the attacking coalition itself to the argumentation framework,
ﬁrst and second order attacks are determined only by the lower levels of abstrac-
tion. Thus coalitions cannot add or delete them at their will, but they can only
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attack them via higher order attacks.
Figure 9.b visualizes two candidate coalitions belonging to the same grid-
based virtual organization attacking each other. In this case, diﬀerently from the
ﬁrst one, candidate coalition C2 does not want to be formed since, for example,
it can achieve its goal without any eﬀort if coalition C1 is formed. Thus C2 ⇒
(C2 ⇒ C1). Let AF = 〈B,→〉 our argumentation framework with C1, C2 ⊆ U
then the extensions are, without the second order attack, E(AF) = {C1} or
E(AF) = {C2}. This situation can be seen as a sort of deadlock. Otherwise,
if there is the presence of the second order attack due to the possibility for
candidate coalition C2 of adding or removing one or more of the dependencies of
the concurrent coalition C1, then the extension is E(AF) = {C1} and the only
formed coalition is C1, as desired by coalition C2. Figure 9.b depicts a second
order attack where a stability argument, not directly represented in the ﬁgure,
sets a preference of coalition C1 over coalition C2. According to Deﬁnition 4,
there can be another stability argument setting the preference of coalition C2
over coalition C1, attacking by means of an higher order attack the ﬁrst stability
argument. This would be the case in which also coalition C1 does not want to
be formed for the same reasons of coalition C2.
4 Analyzing reciprocity based coalitions
In this section, we answer to the third research question. First, we present the
dynamic dependence view and the reﬁned notion of coalition for this view. Sec-
ond, we show how to argue on the attacks between coalitions in this reﬁned level
of abstraction.
4.1 Refining coalitions with dynamic dependencies
[Sichman and Conte 2002] introduce dependence networks, a kind of social net-
works representing how each agent depends on other agents to achieve the goals
he cannot achieve himself. Dependence networks are based on
[Castelfranchi 2003]’s basic notion of social power. They are used to specify early
requirements in the TROPOS methodology [Bresciani et el. 2004], and to model
and reason about agents’ interactions in multiagent systems by
[Sichman and Conte 2002].
Dynamic dependence networks have been introduced by [Caire et al. 2008].
In this work, a dependency between agents can depend on the interaction of
other agents. Here we distinguish “negative” dynamic dependencies where a
dependency exists unless it is removed by a set of agents, due to removal of
a goal or ability of an agent, and “positive” dynamic dependencies where a
dependency may be added due to the power of a third set of agents. As explained
in the following section, these two dynamic dependencies can be used to reason
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Figure 10: Agents forming a coalition (a) or not (b); the ﬁrst two views (c)
about the evolution of candidate coalitions at the dynamic dependence view level
of abstraction.
Definition 5 Dynamic Dependence View. A dynamic dependence network
is a tuple 〈A,G, T, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 where:
– A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals and T is a set of time instants.
– dyndep− : A×2A×2A → 22G is a function that relates with each triple of an
agent and two sets of agents all the sets of goals in which the ﬁrst depends
on the second, unless the third deletes the dependency.
– dyndep+ : A×2A×2A → 22G is a function that relates with each triple of an
agent and two sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the ﬁrst depends
on the second, if the third creates the dependency.
– ≥: A → 2G × 2G is a total pre-order on goals which occur in each agent’s
dependencies: G1 ≥ (a)G2 implies that ∃B,C ⊆ A such that a ∈ B and
G1, G2 ∈ dyndep−(a,B,C) or G1, G2 ∈ dyndep+(a,B,C).
The static dependencies are deﬁned by dep(a,B) = dyndep−(a,B, ∅).
Example 2. Let us consider the example depicted in Figure 10.a where we have
four nodes belonging to a grid-based virtual organization. Node b depends on
node d for goal g3, if node a creates this dependency: dep(a, {d}) = {{g4}},
dep(d, {c}) = {{g2}}, dep(c, {b}) = {{g1}}, dyndep+(b, {d}, {a}) = {{g3}}.
A coalition can be deﬁned in dependence networks, based on the idea that
to be part of a coalition, every agent has to contribute something, and has to
get something out of it. Roughly, a coalition can be formed when there is a cycle
of dependencies (the deﬁnition of coalitions is more complicated due to the fact
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that an agent can depend on a set of agents, see below). We show how depen-
dence networks can be used for coalition evolution, by assuming that goals are
maintenance goals rather than achievement goals, which give us automatically
a longer term and more dynamic perspective.
We deﬁne reciprocity based coalitions for dynamic dependence networks,
ﬁrstly introduced by [Boella et al. 2008], as a reﬁnement of the coalition view.
We represent the coalition not only as a set of agents, like in game theoretical
approaches, but as a set of agents together with a partial dynamic dependence
relation. Intuitively, the dynamic dependence relation represents the “contract”
of the coalition: if H ∈ dyndep+(a,B,D), then the set of agents D is committed
to create the dependency, and the set of agents B is committed to see to the goals
H of agent a. The rationality constraint on such reciprocity based coalitions is
that each agent contributes something, and receives something back. Our notion
of coalition presents the agents composing it not only as utility maximizers as in
coalitional game theoretical approaches but as complex entities with their sets
of beliefs and goals which have to be satisﬁed. In our approach, coalitions have
complex structure, composed by existing dependencies and potential ones which
represent a kind of dynamic contract.
Definition 6 Reciprocity based Coalition. Given a dynamic dependence
network 〈A,G, T, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉, a reciprocity based coalition is repre-
sented by coalition C ⊆ A together with dynamic dependencies dyndep+′ ⊆
dyndep+, such that:
– if ∃b, B,D,H with H ∈ dyndep+′(a,B,D) then a ∈ C, B ⊆ C and D ⊆ C
(the domain of dyndep+
′
contains only agents in coalition C), and
– for each agent a ∈ C we have ∃b, B,D,H with H ∈ dyndep+′(b, B,D) such
that a ∈ B∪D (agent a contributes something, either creating a dependency
or fulﬁlling a goal), and
– for each agent a ∈ C ∃B,D,H with H ∈ dyndep+(a,B,D) (agent a receives
something from the coalition).
The following example illustrates that dependencies will be created by agents
only if these new dependencies work out in their advantage.
Example 3 Continued. Each agent of C1 = {a, b, c, d} creates a dependency or
fulﬁlls a goal. Figure 10.a represents a set of agents composing a coalition in
accordance with Deﬁnition 6 while Figure 10.b represents the same set of agents
not forming a coalition. The diﬀerence among the two ﬁgures consists in the
direction of the arrow joining agents b and d.
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4.2 Maintaining or destroying coalitions
The basic attack relations between coalitions are due to the fact that coalitions
are based on the same goals, diﬀerently from the conﬂicts between coalitions in
Amgoud’s coalition theory [Amgoud 2005] where two coalitions are based on the
same tasks. In the coalition view, we distinguish between two kinds of attacks:
ﬁrst order ones, between atomic arguments, and higher order attacks, between
atomic arguments and attack arguments. In the dynamic dependence view, we
details these two kinds of attacks. Attack relations between coalitions sharing the
same goals are the reﬁned version of ﬁrst order attacks presented in the coalition
view. In this view, we present ﬁrst order attacks as the reciprocal attacks between
coalitions without coming into details of the reasons behind these attacks. In this
reﬁned view, the reason is characterized by the sharing of a goal between the
two (or more) coalitions. In this case, the two candidate coalitions cannot be
formed together since an agent cannot be part of two coalitions at the same
time, particularly if the two candidate coalitions are based on the same goal
since each goal cannot be achieved concurrently by more than one agent.
Definition 7 First order attack. Coalition 〈C1, dyndep1〉 attacks coalition
〈C2, dyndep2〉 if and only if there exist a1, a2, B1, B2, D1, D2, G1, G2 such that
G1 ∈ dyndep1(a1, B1, D1), G2 ∈ dyndep2(a2, B2, G2) and G1 ∩G2 = ∅.
Figure 11 aims to represent in the reﬁned version the two cases in which a
coalition wants or not to be formed. In Figure 11 are depicted two candidate
coalitions composed by 3 nodes of the grid. On the one hand, in the ﬁrst case
we have that both the two candidate coalitions want to be formed. This is a sort
of deadlock situation but it would be solved thanks to the presence of eventual
dynamic dependencies. These two candidate coalitions are attacking each other
as the ﬁrst two coalitions of Figure 9.a. On the other hand, in the second case we
have that both nodes a and c depend on node b to run the ﬁle results.mat and
both of them know that if the other coalition is formed goal g1 will be achieved
without any eﬀort. These two candidate coalitions are attacking each other but
if, for example, coalition C2 has the possibility to delete one of its dependencies
then this higher order attack would decide the formation of coalition C1. In this
way, coalition C2 has obtained its aim and goal g1 will be achieved by agent a.
Deﬁnition 8 presents three diﬀerent classes in which we divide the set of
candidate coalitions due to their features and the sign, positive or negative, of
the dynamic dependencies composing them.
Definition 8. Let A be a set of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition func-
tion is a partial function C : A × 2A × 2G such that
{a | C(a,B,G)} = {b | b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)}, the set of agents proﬁting from the
coalition is the set of agents contributing to it. Let 〈A,G, T, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉
be a dynamic dependence network, and dep the associated static dependencies.
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Figure 11: Candidate coalitions sharing goals.
1. A coalition function C is a coalition if ∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that
C(a,B) → G′ implies G′ ∈ dep(a,B). These coalitions which cannot be de-
stroyed by addition or deletion of dependencies by agents in other coalitions.
2. A coalition function C is a vulnerable coalition if it is not a coalition and
∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B) → G′ implies
G′ ∈ ∪Ddyndep−(a,B,D). Coalitions which do not need new goals or abili-
ties, but whose existence can be destroyed by removing dependencies.
3. A coalition function C is a potential coalition if it is not a coalition or a vul-
nerable coalition and ∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that
C(a,B) → G′ implies G′ ∈ ∪D(dyndep−(a,B,D) ∪G′ ∈ dyndep+(a,B,D)).
Coalitions which could be created or which could evolve if new abilities or
goals would be created by agents of other coalitions on which they dynami-
cally depend.
There are various further reﬁnements of the notion of coalition. For example,
[Boella et al. 2006] look for minimal coalitions. In this paper we do not consider
these further reﬁnements.
Higher order attacks are detailed in the dynamic dependence view by remov-
ing or adding one of the dependencies of the attacked coalition. This kind of
attack is the reﬁned version of higher order attacks of the coalition view and
is represented by means of the stability argument. This kind of attack rela-
tion means a real destruction of the attacked coalition since one or more of its
dependencies are deleted or added and the coalition does not exist any more.
The stability argument establishes the preference and the preferred coalition is
preserved by these additions and removals and thus it maintains its stability.
Higher order attacks attack the coalition by attacking all its attacks to the other
coalitions, independently from what coalition is doing the higher order attack.
2693Boella G., van der Torre, Villata S.: Analyzing Cooperation ...
Figure 12: Two vulnerable coalitions attacking each other.
Definition 9 Higher order attack. ∀C1, C2 such that C1 ⇒ C2, coalition
〈C, dyndep〉 attacks the attack from coalition 〈C1, dyndep1〉 on coalition
〈C2, dyndep2〉 if and only if there exists a set of agents D ⊆ {a | ∃E,H,
C(a,E,H)} such that ∃a,B,G′, C1(a,B,G′) and G ∈ dyndep(a,B,D).
Higher order attacks, presented in deﬁnition 9, can arise if the coalition C
which has to attack the attack C1 ⇒ C2 is composed by a set of agents D such
that they can add or delete at least one dynamic dependency.
Example 4. Assume we have eight agents, a, ..., h and the dependencies of Ex-
ample 2, depicted in Figure 10.c: dep(a, {d}) = {{g4}}, dep(d, {c}) = {{g2}},
dep(c, {b}) = {{g1}}, dyndep+(b, {d}, {a}) = {{g3}}, plus the following ones:
dep(e, {f}) = {{g6}}, dep(f, {e}) = {{g5}}, dep(g, {h}) = {{g1}}, dep(h, {g}) =
{{g5}}, dep(c, {h}) = {{g1}}, dep(g, {b}) = {{g1}}, dep(h, {e}) = {{g5}},
dep(f, {g}) = {{g5}}.
The possible coalitions are C1, C2 and C3 where:
C1 = {dep(a, {d}) = {{g4}}, dep(d, {c}) = {{g2}}, dep(c, {b}) = {{g1}},
dyndep+(b, {d}, {a}) = {{g3}}},
C2 = {dep(e, {f}) = {{g6}}, dep(f, {e}) = {{g5}}},
C3 = {dep(g, {h}) = {{g1}}, dep(h, {g}) = {{g5}}}.
Some of the dependencies remain outside all coalitions (e.g.,
dep(c, {h}) = {{g1}}, dep(g, {b}) = {{g1}}, dep(h, {e}) = {{g5}},
dep(f, {g}) = {{g5}}, not reported in Figure 10.c). Thus, C1 ⇒ C2, C2 ⇒ C1,
C2 ⇒ C3 and C3 ⇒ C2 due to the fact that they share goals g1 and g5 respec-
tively. Note that these attacks are reciprocal. The coalitions attack each other
since agents b and h on which respectively c and g depend for g1 would not make
their part hoping that the other one will do that, so to have a free ride and get
respectively g3 achieved by d and g5 by g.
Figure 12 illustrates a new example of conﬂict among vulnerable coalitions.
Example 5. Using the grid-based scenario, we can model the example depicted
in Figure 12. Assume, in the ﬁrst time instant t1, we have a portion of a vir-
tual organization composed by three nodes, a, b, c represented as agents in our
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model. There are three goals g1: to run the ﬁle results.mat, g2: to save the ﬁle
satellite.mpeg, g3: to save the ﬁle comp.log.
These goals, associated to the power of the agents to achieve them, form the
following dependencies among the agents (we write C(a, b, g1) for C(a, {b}, {g1})
and dep(a, b, g1) for dep(a, {b}) = {g1}): dep(a, b, g1), dep(a, c, g1), dep(b, a, g2),
dep(c, a, g3). The situation is that node a depends on both nodes b and c to run
the ﬁle results.mat and thus to obtain the results of his job, node b depends
on node a for the storage of ﬁle satellite.mpeg and, ﬁnally, node c depends on
node a for the storage of ﬁle comp.log. Thus, there are two candidate coalitions:
C1 = {(a, b, g1), (b, a, g2)}, C2 = {(a, c, g1), (c, a, g3)}.
They will not create both since one is enough for node a to have someone look
after his goal g1: C1 ⇒ C2 and C2 ⇒ C1. Now, we assume that node c removes
the necessity of node b to store the ﬁle satellite.mpeg, destroying the dependency
dep(b, a, g2), i.e., we substitute it with dyndep−(b, a, c, g2), e.g., by removing the
power of node a to see to goal g2, or by removing the goal g2 of node b. This
deletion, shown in time instant t2 of Figure 12, allows node c to ensure himself
the dependency on himself of node a to perform his job, goal g1. In this way,
node c ensures himself the help of node a to store ﬁle comp.log. This deletion
sets a preference relation of the candidate coalition C2, represented here with
the attack of coalition C2 to the attack relation of coalition C1 to coalition C2.
In this case, coalition C2 = {(a, c, g1), (c, a, g3)} will become the only possible
extension, since C2 ⇒ (C1 ⇒ C2) by Deﬁnition 9.
5 Future research
In this section, we reﬁne the abstract coalition models with powers of sets of
agents and the conditional goals of the agents. We present two more reﬁned
viewpoints, the power view and the agent view, but the analysis of reciprocity
based coalitions at these reﬁned levels is not provided in the paper and it is
left for future research. In classical planners, goals are unconditional. Therefore,
many models of goal based reasoners, including the model of [Boella et al. 2004],
deﬁne the goals of a set of agents A by a function goals : A → 2G, where G is
the complete set of goals. However, in many agent programming languages and
architectures, goals are conditional and can be generated. The power to trigger
a goal is distinguished from the power to fulﬁll a goal.
Definition 10 Power view. The Power view is represented by the tuple
〈A,G,X, T, goals, power-goals, power〉, where A, G, X and T are sets of agents,
goals, decision variables, and time instants, goals : A → 2G, and power-goals :
2A → 2(A×G) is a function associating with each set of agents the goals they can
create for agents, and power : 2A → 2G is a function associating with agents the
goals they can achieve.
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The function power represents what goals each agent or group of agents can
achieve without being supported by other agents. For example, power({a1}) =
{g1} means that agent a1 is able to achieve g1. Note that it is not given that g1
is a goal of agent a1. We therefore extend the agent view with conditional goals.
Definition 11 Agent view. The Agent view is represented by the tuple
〈A,G,X, T, goals, skills, R〉, where A,G,X, T are disjoint sets of agents, goals,
decision variables, and time instants, goals is as before, skills : A → 2X is a
function associating with an agent its possible decisions, and R : 2X → 2G is a
function associating with decisions the goals they achieve.
The power view can be deﬁned as an abstraction of the agent view. A set
of agents B has the power to see to it that agent a has the goal g, written as
(a, g) ∈ power-goals(B), if and only if there is a set of decisions of B such that
g becomes a goal of a. A set of agents B has the power to see to goal g if and
only if there is a set of decisions of B such that g is a consequence of it.
Definition 12. 〈A,G, T, goals, power-goals, power〉 is an abstraction from
〈A,G,X, T, goals, skills, R〉 if and only if: (a, g) ∈ power-goals(B) if and only if
∃Y ⊆ skills(B) with skills(B) = ∪{skills(b) | b ∈ B} such that g ∈ goals(a, Y ),
and g ∈ power(B) if and only if ∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that g ∈ R(Y ).
Abstracting power view to a dynamic dependence network can be done as
follows. Note that in this abstraction, the creation of a dynamic dependency is
based only on the power to create goals. In other models, creating a dependency
can also be due to creation of new skills of agents.
Definition 13. 〈A,G, T, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 is an abstraction of
〈A,G, T, power-goals, power〉, if we have H ∈ dyndep+(a,B,C) if and only if
∀g ∈ H : (a, g) ∈ power-goals(C), and H ⊆ power(B).
Combining these two abstractions, abstracting agent view to a dynamic de-
pendence view can be done as follows.
Proposition14. 〈A,G, T, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 is an abstraction of
〈A,G,X, T, goals, skills, R〉, if we have H ∈ dyndep+(a,B,C) if and only if
∃Y ⊆ skills(C) such that H ⊆ goals(a, Y ), and ∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that
H ⊆ R(Y ).
The arguing at these reﬁned levels of abstraction is our main aim for fu-
ture work. The approach we plan to apply will follow the examples provided in
[Boella et al. 2005] and [Amgoud and Prade 2009], particularly concerning the
agent view in which we describe an agent by means of the same features of these
works such as goals, beliefs and so on. The main diﬀerence concerns the power
view which is not considered in these works and which has to be representing
taking into account also the implicit notion of group present in it.
2696 Boella G., van der Torre, Villata S.: Analyzing Cooperation ...
6 Related Work
This paper is a revised and extended version of the papers [Boella et al. 2008]
and [Boella et al. 2008], where in the former we introduced the four viewpoints
and in the latter we introduced higher order attacks, while in this paper we add
iterative design.
Although there were many approaches deﬁning coalition formation, two rep-
resents diﬀerent perspectives: the model of [Shehory and Kraus 1998] and the
one of [Sichman 1998]. [Shehory and Kraus 1998] present algorithms that enable
the agents to form groups and assign a task to each group, calling these groups
coalitions. [Sichman 1998] presents coalition formation using a dependence-based
approach based on the notion of social dependence [Castelfranchi 2003]. Another
deﬁnition of coalition inspired by dependence networks is given by
[Boella et al. 2006]. See [Sauro 2005] for a further discussion. Once represented
the internal structure of coalitions, one could study which kind of relations there
are among candidate coalitions at an higher level of detail disregarding which
are the causes for incompatibility. In this paper we use an argument labeling by
[Jakobovits and Vermeir 1999] and [Caminada 2006]. They show that semantics
can also be described by a three valued argument labeling, where the ﬁrst two
conditions represent conﬂict free and defense, and the third one represents the
so-called reinstatement principle. They show how the other semantics can be de-
ﬁned in terms of these labelings too. The generation of arguments with auxiliary
arguments and the condition on argumentation frameworks are formalized by
[Modgil 2007]. For a further discussion, see [Boella et al. 2008].
The application of argumentation frameworks to coalition formation has been
discussed by [Amgoud 2005] and by [Bulling et al. 2008]. The latter combines
the argumentation framework and ATL presenting a generalization of Dung’s
argumentation framework, extended with a preference relation. Alternating-
time temporal logic is a temporal logic that is used for reasoning about the
behavior and abilities of agents under various rationality assumptions. The key
construct in ATL expresses that a coalition of agents can enforce a given for-
mula [Alur et al. 2002]. [Amgoud 2005], instead, proposes to use an extension
of Dung’s argumentation theory with preferences and associated dialogue theo-
ries as a formal framework for coalition formation. As preferred extensions exist
for every argumentation framework, we can introduce the preferred solutions
to coalitional games by deﬁning them as the preferred extensions of the corre-
sponding argumentation system. Amgoud illustrates this idea by formalizing a
task based theory of coalition formation, where the conﬂict relation represents
that two coalitions contain the same task. However, a drawback of this abstract
approach is that it is less clear where the preferences among coalitions come
from. In contrast with our approach, a coalition is viewed as an abstract entity
whose structure is not known. Unlike Amgoud’s work, we do not provide this
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paper with a proof theory since it is derivable from the argumentation theory’s
literature. Another formal approach to reason about coalitions is coalition logic
[Pauly 2002] and ATL [Alur et al. 2002], describing how a group of agents can
achieve a set of goals, but without considering the internal structure of the group
of agents [van der Hoek et al. 2005].
Concerning design, the TROPOS methodology [Bresciani et el. 2004] covers
ﬁve phases of the software development process: the early requirements allowing
to analyse and model the requirements of the context in which the software
system will be inserted, late requirements describing the requirements of the
software system, architectural design and detailed design aiming to design the
architecture of the system and, ﬁnally, the code implementation. The idea of
focusing the activities that precede the speciﬁcation of software requirements,
in order to understand how the intended system will meet organizational goals,
has been ﬁrst proposed in requirements engineering, speciﬁcally in [Yu 1995] ’s
work with his i* model . The i* model oﬀers actors, goals and actor dependencies
as primitive concepts. The rationale of the i* model is that by doing an earlier
analysis, one can capture not only the what or the how, but also the why a piece
of software is developed. This, in turn, supports a more reﬁned analysis of system
dependencies and encourages a uniform treatment of the system’s functional and
non-functional requirements.
7 Summary
In this paper, we present an approach to iteratively design social networks by
introducing four viewpoints, the reﬁnement relations between them, and the
methods to analyze cooperation based on emerging coalitions. Iterative design is
a design methodology based on a cyclic process of analyzing and reﬁning a work
in progress. In iterative design, interaction with the designed system is used as
a form of research for evolving a project and successive iterations of a design are
implemented. The designer starts with the more abstract level and reﬁnes it in
each step to the level below it.
We analyze the reciprocity based coalitions that emerge in social networks
at various degrees of abstraction. At the most abstract viewpoint, coalitions are
abstract entities and we adapt existing coalition argumentation theory to reason
about these coalitions seen as arguments. We introduce the stability argument
preferring a coalition over the others and the attack relations between them. This
argumentation theory allows to model the attacks among candidate coalitions
and to decide if a coalition is formed. This analysis is reﬁned in the dynamic
dependence view providing the composition of each coalitions and the reasons
behind the attacks and the preferences between them. Further analysis at the
most reﬁned views is left for future work.
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We reﬁne abstract coalition models with social dynamic dependencies among
agents, powers of sets of agents, and plans by making the dependence relation
conditional to the agents that have the power to create or delete it. These dy-
namic dependencies are higher order dependencies reﬂecting the behaviours of
the more abstract higher order attacks of the coalition view. A further reﬁne-
ment leads to the deﬁnition the power view and the agent view. The agent view
is the most detailed view considering all the features of the single agents as facts,
goals and skills but it looses the notion of “group” which is present, instead, in
the power view, associating a set of agents to the goals they can achieve.
Subjects of further research are the use of our new theory for coalition forma-
tion. For example, when two agents can make the other depend on itself and thus
create a potential coalition, when will they do so? Moreover, in this paper we
concentrate our attention on single coalitions. We aim to extend this model by
considering more than one formed coalition which cooperates with other coali-
tions in order to achieve an increased outcome. From this point of view, the
extended model represent each coalition as a node of an argumentation network
in which coalitions have to manage attack decisions and coalitions can aggregate
to each other due to their decisions and the achievable outcome represented by
a game.
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